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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND REO, INC., 
Pl,aintiff and Respondent,, 
vs. 
EULA M. CRANE, Executrix of the 
estate of Harold F. Crane, deceased, 




Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County, 
Honorable Leonard W. Elton 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DUANE B. WELLING 
Moffat, Iverson and Taylor 
Attorneys for Defendant·AppellaDt 
1311 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
333 South Second East F I L E D Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 a 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DIAMOND REO, INC. 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
EULA M. CRANE, Executrix of the 
estate of Harold F. Crane, deceased, 




STATE.MENT OF THE NAT URE OJ<-. CASE 
This case centers upon an interpretation of Section 
75-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which establishes 
a Statute of Limitations for the filing of claims upon an 
estate after rejection of said claim by the Executrix of 
the estate, and further upon the refusal of the trial court 
to hear evidence relating to facts considered in a Mo-
tion for a Summary .Judgment which has been dismissed 
by a preceding District Court judge. 
I 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
I. Motion for Swnmary Judgment was denied hr 
Judge Bryant H. Croft. ( R. 35) 
2. Consideration of the statutory interpretation 
was refused by the trial court. Judgment was granted to 
Plaintiff on the accounting in the sum of $3,160.97, to-
gether with interest in the sum of $1,128.88, plus costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment filed 
herein, dismissing with prejudice the judgment of thr 
trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff and Respondent filed a claim against 
the Def endaut and Appellant as Executrix of the estate 
of Harold F. Crane, deceased, and said claim was 
promptly denied by the Executrix and by one of the 
judges of the District Court on the 13th day of June. 
1967. The notice of rejection of said claim was filed 
with the clerk of said court on or about June 13, 1967 
No other notice was given to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
failed to bring suit upon said claim against the Execu· 
trix within three months of filing of such notice, and the 
claim was due prior to the date of filing. The Plaintiff 
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d his action against the Defendant on the first day 
d' Y nch, 1968, more than eight months after Plaintiff's 
daim was denied, and notice of rejection was filed with 
the clerk of the court (R. 18 and 19). 
An affidavit in the above entitled matter in sup-
port of the Defendant's Motion for Summary J udg-
ment was properly filed in the above entitled action, and 
the facts set forth therein were uncontroverted (R. 18 
and 29). 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
denied by a judge of the District Court, which denial is 
e,·idenced by minute entry ( R. 35). No order denying 
said motion was ever signed or entered by said judge. 
Section 75-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-
vides: 
"Action on rejected claim - Limitation of ac-
tion. 'Vhen a claim is rejected, either by the ex-
ecutor or administrator or the judge, and notice 
of rejection has been filed with the clerk, the 
holder must bring suit in the proper court against 
the executor or administrator within three 
months after filing of such notice, if the claim is 
then due, or within two months after it becomes 
due; otherwise the claim shall be forever barred." 
The above entitled matter was tried before one of 
the judges of the District Court on the 22nd day of 
May, 1969. The Court determined that, inasmuch as 
the ::\lotion for Summary Judgment had been denied by 
3 
an associate District Court Judge, he had no authoriti 
to, nor would he, hear any evidence relating to the M.; 
tion for Summary Judgment; specifically, he would 1101 
hear matters relating to the statutory que::.ljou wiJ; .. :. 
was raised by the Motion for Summary Judgment (R 
44, lines 1 through 5; R. 44, lines 25 and 26). Trial 
then proceeded relative only to questions concerning 
the accounting in question. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE: DECREE A'VARDING 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF FAILED TO 
PROPERLY INTERPRET SECTION 75·9·9, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, 'VHERE· 
BY UNTIMELY CLAIMS AGAINST AX 
ESTATE ARE BARRED. 
Section 75-9-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, spe· 
cifically states the requirements for rejection of a claim 
against an estate, together with the Statute of Limita· 
'tions. The following requirements are established: 
1. Rejection by an executor or administrator or 
judge. 
2. Filing notice of rejection with the clerk. 
3. Holder of a rejected claim must bring suit in 
the proper court against the executor or administrator 
within three months after the filing of such notice with 
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the derk (if the claim is then due, or within two months 
after it becomes due). 
'J.. 'Vithout timely filing of suit, the claim shall be 
forever barred. 
There is no provision within the above referenced 
statute for notice to be filed other than with the clerk. 
This, in fact, was accomplished, as were all other re-
quirements for rejection as set forth above, and are un-
controverted, as established by the affidavit of J. Grant 
Iverson, ( R. 18 and 19) . The claim submitted by Plain-
tiff-Respondent, Diamond Reo, Utah, Inc., was de-
nied by the Executrix and one of the judges of the Dis·· 
trict Court on the 13th day of June, 1967, and filed with 
the clerk of said court on or about the 13th day of June, 
1967. The Plaintiff-Respondent failed to bring suit 
upon the claim within three months after filing of such 
notice, the claim being then due. Suit was not filed until 
the first day of March, 1968, more than eight months 
after Plaintiff's claim was denied and notice of rejection 
filed with the clerk of the court. There is no ambiguity 
within the terms of the statute, and by the uncontrovert-
ed facts the claim under the terms of the statute "shall 
be forever barred." 
Section 75-9-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
places additional restrictions in harmony with the prev-
iously cited statute by stating: 
"No claim must be allowed by the executor or ad-
ministrator or the judge which is barred by the 
Statute of Limitations." 
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The Respondent would place an additional require 
ment within the terms of the statute to the effect tk 
notice must be given to claimants as well as to the cbl 
of the court. Neither the Respondent nor the trial cour• 
has the ability to rewrite the statutes of the State 11\ 
Utah to impose greater responsibilities than those esta/J. 
lished specifically by statute. 
The case of Holloway, et ux, vs 'Vetzel, S. Ct. of 
Utah May 28, 1935, 45 P. 2d 565, 86 Utah 387, set1 
forth: 
"Under R. S. 1933, 1029-10, an administrator 
cannot waive or abandon the Statute of Limita-
tions, nor can the court in passing upon a claim 
on a decedent approve one against which the 
statute has run. This court has so held in the 
case of Gulbranson vs. Thompson, 63 Utah rn. 
222 P. 590. And a failure to plead the statute 
cannot be of any avail to the party claiming 
against the estate. If the evidence disclosed that 
a claim is barred, it must not be allowed, and no 
judgment can be entered thereon, whether the 
statute is pleaded or not. Hawkley vs Heaton: 
54 Utah 314, 180 P. 440, and cases therein cited. 
By all logical interpretation of the above refer-
enced statute, it appears that no other interpretation can 
be made as to the requirements of notice and that in fact 
all of the elements required have been met by the Ap· 
pellant-Defendant, and that the Plaintiff-Respondent 
has not met his burden of filing suit within the time al· 
lowed by the Statute of Limitations. 
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Under the law pronounced in the case of Robison 
Ys Robison, 63 Utah 68, 222 P. 595, at page 596, quot-
·.ig the Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Section 7648, a 
statute similar to our present statute was interpreted, 
which stated: 
"'Vhen a claim is rejected, either by the executor 
or administrator, or the judge, the holder must 
bring suit in the proper court against the execu-
tor or administrator within three months after 
the date of its rejection if it be then due, or with-
in two months after it becomes due. Otherwise, 
the claim shall be forever barred." 
Said statute was amended to its present form in one 
particular only, that notice of the rejection be filed with 
the clerk. 
It is apparent that by amendment of the statute 
the very question of notice is put to rest in that notice 
of rejection is required only to be filed with the clerk. 
Should notice of any other nature be required, the 
statute should have so provided. 
POINT TWO. TRIAL COURT REFUSED 
TO HEAR EVIDENCE RELATING TO THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE ABOVE REF-
ERENCED STATUTE BY DETERMINING 
THAT MINUTE ENTRY ORDER OF PRIOR 
JUDGE DISMISSING A MOTION FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT ON THE ABOVE REF-
ERENCED QUESTION PRECLUDED THE 
TRIAL COURT'S CONSIDERATION OF THE 
STATUTE. 
7 
The record indicates the trial judge differed witl1 
the view of the judge ruling on the Motion for Sun:. 
mary Judgment ( R. 43) but he determined that h, 
could not review the facts associated with the l\Iotio11 
for Summary Judgment (R. 43, line 14; R. 43, line 30: 
R. 44, lines I through 5) . The court finally determined 
that it would hear only the suit on the accounting (R 
44, lines 25 and 26) . 
While the matter of summary judgment was deter. 
mined by an earlier judge of the District Court, such a 
determination did not preclude the trial court from : 
hearing evidence relative to the Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the trial court erred in refusing to take 
evidence relating to the statutory question. Em 
though the trial court did refuse to take evidence rela-
tive to the statutory question, the file contained the 
affidavit previously referenced by J. Grant Iverson : 
setting forth all of the facts required upon which to 
make a determination. That affidavit was not contro· 
verted at any time by counter-affidavit or by additional 
testimony. Therefore, the facts set forth therein muot 
be accepted, and should have been considered by the · 
trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant-Appellant submits that the court 
erred initially in its interpretation of the statutory pro-
visions hereinabove set forth in the denial of a motiou 
8 
'.'or judgment, and further that the trial court 
errr<l m refusing to consider the statutory question 
raised at the time of trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DUANE B. WELLING 
Moffat, Iverson and Taylor 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
1311 ':V alker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
